Con Law
Terms
undefined, object
copy deck
- Southern Pacific Company v Arizona
- Arizona banned operation of trains more than 14 passenger cars of 70 freight cars long. Question: Was the Arizona law an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce? FOUND: Yes it was such a burden. The Arizona law imposed a stiff burden on the railroad. It had to operate 30 percent more trains in the state, and it had to break up and remake trains passing through the state. The total cost was several million dollars a year. Moreover, more trains would produce more accidents and the state's safety argument was empirically weak. The innovation in this decision was Stone's use of an "interest-balancing" standard of review, which proved more demanding than the earlier "rational basis" test.
- I.N.S. v. Chadha
- In one section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress authorized either House of Congress to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United States Attorney General. Chadha had stayed in the U.S. past his visa deadline and was ordered to leave the country. The House of Representatives suspended the Immigration judge's deportation ruling. This case was decided together with United States House of Representatives v. Chadha and United States Senate v. Chadha. Question: Did the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed a one-House veto of executive actions, violate the separation of powers doctrine? FOUND: The Court held that the particular section of the Act in question did violate the Constitution. Recounting the debates of the Constitutional Convention over issues of bicameralism and separation of powers, Chief Justice Burger concluded that even though the Act would have enhanced governmental efficiency, it violated the "explicit constitutional standards" regarding lawmaking and congressional authority.
- Alden V. Maine
- Legal Provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment. A group of of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in 1992 alleging that the state had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996)_which held that States are immune from private suits in federal court and that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate that immunity_the probation officers' suit was dismissed in Federal district court. Alden and the other probation officers then sued Maine again for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time in state court. The state trial court and the state supreme court both held that Maine had sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in their own court. Question:May Congress use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from private suits in its own courts? FOUND: No. A sharply divided court held in a 5-4 decision that Congress may not use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Both the terms and history of the eleventh amendment suggest that States are immune from suits in their own courts. And more generally, the original understanding of the Constitution's structure and the terms of the tenth amendment confirm that states retained much of their sovereignty despite their agreeing that the national government would be supreme when exercising its enumerated powers.
- Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida
- Legal Provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment . The Seminole Tribe brought suit against the State of Florida for violating the good faith negotiations requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Florida moved to dismiss the Tribe's action, alleging that the lawsuit violated Florida's sovereign immunity. On appeal from the District Court's denial of Florida's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment shielded Florida from federal suit and that under Ex Parte Young, the Tribe may not enforce its right to good faith negotiations by naming Florida's governor as a party to the suit. Question:Does the Eleventh Amendment provide Florida with immunity from the Tribe lawsuit? FOUND: Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, The Court held that Congress did intend to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the IGRA but that the Indian Commerce Clause (and by implication the Commerce Clause) did not give Congress that power. Under the Eleventh Amendment, all states are regarded as sovereign entities. Such sovereignty inherently implies that states may not be sued by parties without their consent, even if they are given authority to regulate those parties' activities through receipt of federal funds. Finally, Ex Parte Young's ruling does not justify the Tribe's suit against Florida's governor in light of certain IGRA provisions which specifically prohibit such an action.
- United States v. Kahriger
- In 1951, Congress adopted the Gamblers' Occupational Tax Act which required gamblers to register with the Collector of Internal Revenue and levied a tax on their gambling income. QUESTION: Did the Act violate the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. FOUND: The Court upheld the law. Justice Reed argued that the law did not violate a person's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because under its registration provisions, individuals were "not compelled to confess to acts already committed." The statute simply informed people who wanted to "engage in the business of wagering" that they would be required to "fulfill certain conditions." The Tenth Amendment was not offended as Reed found that the tax produced revenue and was not inconsistent with similar taxes which the Court had previously approved.
- Cooley v. Board of Wardens
- A Pennsylvania law required that all ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia hire a local pilot. Ships that fail to do so would be subject to a fine, which would go to a fund for retire pilots and their dependents. This fund was administered by the Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadephia. Cooley was a ship owner. He refused to hire a local pilot and he also refused to pay the fine. Question: Does the law violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution? FOUND: According to Justice Curtis, who wrote the majority opinion, the pilotage law did not violate the Constitution. Congress had provided in 1789 that state pilotage laws should govern. Navigation was commerce; and, piloting was navigation. Though the subject to be regulated was commerce, the interesting twist here was whether the Commerce Power was exlusive. Some subjects demand a single uniform rule for the whole nation, while others, like pilotage, demand diverse local rules to cope with varying local conditions. The power of Congress was therefore selectively exclusive.
- Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.
- email professor. 7 to one opinion, no facts found on oyez.
- C&A Carbone, Inc v. Town of Clarkstown
- Legal Provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause. A New York town, Clarkstown, allowed a contractor to construct and operate a waste processing plant within town limits. The revenue from the plant would help compensate the contractor. Clarkstown promised that the plant would receive 120,000 tons of solid waste each year, and permitted the contractor to charge an $81 "tipping fee" for each ton received. To meet the 120,000 ton quota, Clarkstown adopted a "flow control ordinance. In 1991, a Carbone truck carrying illegal waste crashed and police discovered that Carbone was violating the ordinance. Clarkstown sued Carbone in a New York Supreme Court. Carbone responded by suing Clarkstown in a federal District Court, claiming that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause by disrupting interstate commerce. The District Court agreed but dissolved its injunction against Clarkstown when the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of Clarkstown. Question: Does a town's "flow control ordinance," which requires that all waste pass through a certain waste processing plant, violate the interstate Commerce Clause by disrupting commerce for waste processing plants in other states. FOUND: Yes. Tthe Court held 6-3 that the Commerce Clause invalidates local laws that discriminate against interstate commerce, disrupt the flow of articles of commerce, and grant municipalities disproportionate market gains. In an opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court found that "the article of commerce...is the service of processing and disposing of [waste]." The Court held that the flow ordinance was discriminatory because "[i]t hoards solid waste...for the benefit of the preferred processing facility." For the ordinance to be constitutional, the municipality would have had to prove that its effects on commerce are nondiscriminatory and justified by a "legitimate local interest."
- New York v. United States
- Legal Provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Courtland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management. Question: Does the Low-Level Waste Act violate the Tenth Amendment and the "guarantee clause" of article four? FOUND:In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld two of the three provisions of the Act under review, reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to use financial rewards and access to disposal sites as incentives for state waste management. The third provision, the "take-title" qualification, stipulated that states must take legal ownership and liability for low-level waste or by the regulatory act. "Either type of federal action," wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments." This last provision violated the Tenth Amendment.
- Bush V. Gore 2000
- The Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution? Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment," the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Even if the recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county. Because of those and other procedural difficulties, the court held that no constitutional recount could be fashioned in the time remaining (which was short because the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the "safe harbor" provided by 3 USC Section 5). Loathe to make broad precedents, the per curiam opinion limited its holding to the present case.
- National league of Cities v. Usery
- Legal Provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause . In 1974, Congress passed amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The purpose of the amendments was to regulate minimum wage and overtime pay for state and local government employees. The National League of Cities, as well as several states and cities, challenged the constitutionality of the amendments. Question: May Congress, acting under its commerce power, regulate the labor market of state employees, which the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states? FOUND:Congress may not regulate the labor market of state employees. The Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting legislation which operates "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." While the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause is "plenary," that power has constitutional limits. In this case, the exercise of the commerce power ran afoul of the Tenth Amendment which protects the states' traditional activities.
- Bibb v. Navajo Freight LInes Inc.
- The Illinois legislature adopted a law requiring all trucks and trailers traveling on the state's highways to operate with contour mudguards. The legislators believed that this specific type of mudguard would protect motorists by preventing trucks from throwing debris into the windshields of passing or trailing vehicles.. Question: law which required a specific type of rear mudguard on trucks and trailers operated on Illinois's state highways conflict with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution? FOUND: Yes. The Court held that the Illinois requirement did place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. While arguing that safety measures "carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged," Justice Douglas nevertheless affirmed that if the effect of such measures are "slight or problematical" then the interests of commerce should prevail. Since the Illinois law was unlike the requirements of almost all of the other states in the nation, the Court found that it did place a great burden on the interstate transport of goods.
- Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm.
- In 1972, the North Carolina Board of Agriculture adopted a regulation that required all apples shipped into the state in closed containers to display the USDA grade or nothing at all. Washington State growers(whose standards are higher than the USDA) challenged the regulation as an unreasonable burden to interstate commerce. North Carolina stated it was a valid exercise of its police powers to create "uniformity" to protect its citizenry from "fraud and deception". Question: Did the North Carolina regulation violate the Commerce Clause by placing an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce? The Court voted unanimously that the North Carolina regulation was an unconstitutional exercise of the state's power over interstate commerce. Although the regulation was facially neutral, it had a discriminatory impact on the Washington growers while shielding the local growers from the same burden. The regulation removed the competitive advantage gained by the Washington apples from stricter inspection standards. The regulation produced a leveling effect that works to the local advantage by "downgrading" apples from other states unjustly. Therefore, the regulation places an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
- Clinton v. City of New York
- Separation of Powers: This case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality of two cancellations, made by President William J. Clinton, under the Line Item Veto Act ("Act"). In the first, the City of New York, two hospital associations, a hospital, and two health care unions, challenged the President's cancellation of a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which relinquished the Federal Government's ability to recoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes levied against Medicaid providers by the State of New York. In the second, the Snake River farmer's cooperative and one of its individual members challenged the President's cancellation of a provision of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The provision permitted some food refiners and processors to defer recognition of their capital gains in exchange for selling their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. After a district court held the Act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal. Question? Did the President's ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, under the Line Item Veto Act, violate the Presentment Clause of Article I? FOUND: Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City of New York, and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperative suffered sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions. The Court then explained that under the Presentment Clause, legislation that passes both Houses of Congress must either be entirely approved (i.e. signed) or rejected (i.e. vetoed) by the President. The Court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue, under authority granted him by the Act, the President in effect "amended" the laws before him. Such discretion, the Court concluded, violated the "finely wrought" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers.
- Buckley V. Valeo 1976
- Legal Provision: Article 2, Section 2, Paragraph 2: Appointments Clause . restricting financial contributions to candidates, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute. Question Did the limits placed on electoral expenditures by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech and association clauses? First, it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the "integrity of our system of representative democracy" by guarding against unscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association.
- U ov ALabama board of trustees v. Garret
- After Patricia Garrett, Director of Nursing for the University of Alabama, was diagnosed with breast cancer, her treatment forced her to take a substantial leave from work. Upon her return, her supervisor informed her she would have to give up her position. Milton Ash, a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services, who suffers from chronic asthma, requested that his employer modify his duties to accommodate him. Ultimately, none of Ash's requested relief was granted and his job performance evaluations fell. Both Garrett and Ash filed discrimination suits against their Alabama state employers, seeking money damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits the States and other employers from "discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of that disability... in regard to... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." The District Court disposed of both cases by ruling that the ADA exceeds Congress' authority to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed. QUESTION? May an individual sue a state for damages in federal court under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990? FOUND: No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages by reason of the state's failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Chief Justice wrote for the majority that "in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation." Rehnquist added that none of these requirements had been met
- Garcia V. San Antonio Met. Transit Authority
- Legal Provision: Fair Labor Standards . The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTA argued that it was providing a "traditional" governmental function, which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act. Question:Did principles of federalism make the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority immune from the Fair Labor Standards Act? FOUND: In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the guiding principles of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery were unworkable and that SAMTA was subject to Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. The Court found that rules based on the subjective determination of "integral" or "traditional" governmental functions provided little or no guidance in determining the boundaries of federal and state power. The Court argued that the structure of the federal system itself, rather than any "discrete limitations" on federal authority, protected state sovereignty.
- Printz v. United States
- The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local chief law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found the background-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could remain. The supreme court granted certiorari and decided this with Mack v. United States. Question: Using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I as justification, can Congress temporarily require state CLEOs to regulate handgun purchases by performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant background checks? FOUND: No. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. must be based on voluntarily.
- Nevada Dept. of Human Resources V. Hibbs 2003
- Legal Provision: Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause . William Hibbs. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed. Question: May an individual sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993? FOUND: Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision. The Court reasoned that Congress both clearly stated its intention to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court under the FMLA and acted within its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting prophylactic, rather than substantively redefining, legislation. "In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic [section] 5 legislation," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist