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phil ethics reasons


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Reasons - Three types

Expl-fs figure in expl of event-volcano b/c gases built up

Normative rs-fs that justify an action or belief-considerations that count in favor

Operative-facts person takes to be normative, and his doing so figures in expl for why perf

Type of reason Williams talks about - often unclear which is being discussed

normative rather than op when says P has r to X if sound delib route from one of her aims to an aim to do X

W emphasizes, in calling f an r, we are advising her in some way 

Scanlon and judgment sensitive attitudes

set of things for which rs can be asked for or offered-atts an ideally rational person come to have whenever judged suff r to have them, and cease to have when judged not supported

Bel, Int, fears, respect, contempt 

Scanlon - judgment sensitive attitudes and actions

Only have rs for action deriv-taking action X presup we have intention to X, and having that requires us to take ourselves to have a reason to X.

Intentions are what make events actions, so determ kinds rs app for action 

Scanlon - nature of judgment sensitive attitudes

having one involves having complex set dispositions to deliberate and act in certain ways.

person intends X feel favorably towards X and tend to seek ways satisfy intention. 

Moral judgments and motivation - relationship

rational person has only judgment-sens att he judges there suff r have.

If rat person judges suff reason X, he will intend to X, and this j is suff expl for his forming that intention.

Unnec invoke add motivational factor (desire) beyond j

Scanlon's view relationship reason and motivation - externalist or internalist about moral judgments

Scanlon is externalist b/c conceptually possible to judge and not be motivated

But Kantians have similar account relation judg and motivation, but they  posit a deep down rational disposition we all have to follow the requirements of reason<

Desires - usually understood as states of mind that play two roles

Scanlon's view - no psychological state play both roles 

desires are what usually or always move us to act

supposed to be normatively important in that if person has reason to X this is sometimes if not always true b/c doing this would help to satisfy one of her desires. 

Senses of desire - wide, narrow, directed attention - wide

set of any 'pro attitude' someone has towards an event or soa regardless of content of att.

clearly move us to act

Nagel argues some do not seem orig sources motivation, rather consequences of them - seeing something as a reason&nbs

Senses of desire - wide, narrow, directed attention -narrow

set of orig sources motive, something like that-include maybe constituted by Smith calls strong phenom desires, which, like sensations, have phenom sensation-thirst


Problem with narrow desires

Pr-not nec involve feature seems ess having desire-being disposed see something good about it-Quinn urge all radios, no desire

some desires have no phenom content-Hume's

Senses of desire - wide, narrow, directed attention - directed attention and Scanlon

p has desire in DAS that P if person's attention is directed insistently toward considerations that present themselves as counting in favor of P.

Captures desires food and sex, idea that desires are unreflective parts thinking can conflict wi

Desire in the directed attention sense - and motivation

When we do have these desires and act on them, what accounts for our motive is seeing something as a reason, not an additional element of desire.

It isn't the case that these desires are what always move us to act-often do things have no desi

Views about relationship between desires and reasons - internalism and externalism - internalism
Int-p has r to X only if doing so would promote fulfillment of some desire she has or would have under some approp conditions-common sense, many rs based on ds, is true for all-not harm others make provisions future wellbeing whether or not fulfill curren
Views about relationship between desires and reasons - internalism and externalism - externalism
Externalism is view that it can be true that someone has a reason to X even though Xing would not serve or furthr any aim or value that matters to the agent.
Desire in directed attention sense - analysis of Owen Wingrave case - the case

Williams-Owen 'left cold' by military life though relatives insist he has good r take it up b/c of honor of doing so

Williams says O has no reason join bc doing so would not promote fulfillm any elements in 'subj motiv set'. 

Desire in directed attention sense - analysis of Owen Wingrave case - Scanlon's analysis

O has no r take up service, but not for r W says.

good r choose career which have desire in DAS since failing do so likely make unsucc at it-choosing career main r not derive d, rather one sees career as exciting, honorable.

Case not show a

Williams account of internal reasons

wd-incl dispo, evals, projects

a has r to X only if sound delib route from elem in a's sms to concl something to be said for Xing.

sdr-instr reas, seeing a be conv, econom get what cares abou.

Williams arguments for his view

ex Owen-suggest seems false (sometimes brow) say x has r even though no basis for r in sms

defend ext faced with diff task showing that truth of statements about ext r can help to explain how people come to have new motivations 

Williams view more plausible - broadening what is included in subjective motivational set

need not show sdr from actual motivations or narrow desires

Effect make view more ext-sms can incl disp (even not manifest) to react to certain fs, props, actions

Ext expl how m by rs by appealing disp of this sort. 

Objections to Williams on internal reasons

r care about wb of others even if not reach by sdr-even if browb, does not mean not true

truth of ext r state expl how come to new motiv-rat norm adopt jsa believe most r have-if have false b about rs then S W agree not irr-so person has r, even

Kant on reasons - theoretical questions about them

most phil think concept of r primi cannot be further analyzed-intuition suppo tell which fs are r

many contexts need not raise q since due for ord disc

can raise theor q about which fs rs, why they are so, how come to know and what expl nor

Kantian account of reasons - overview

K's grand project s+e basic ps of rat that expl why certain fs are good rs-set aside whether part ps rat choice correct, focus idea rs are fs play part role in a rationale that incl ps of rat choice

claims ought do (as imperf) claims what rat

Kant on reasons - apply principle of rational choice - rationale -  HI
HI p rat choice-does not deatch in sense does not place uncond requ, have option give up ends-to argue part conclusion, need prem that X wills E and phi is nec means
Kant on reasons - apply principle of rational choice - rationale - CI

KOE-cite moral principles chosen, cite complex part fs of case at hand that make it fall under rules-P in situation in which general rule R applies and requires P to A and P can do A.

So rat requires P to do A or in other words P ought to A 

Kant on reasons - getting reasons out of applying these principles of rational choice  

which facts picked out by rationale vary with context-which facts most salient

If asked why bring back book, promised, you need it.  Or why take this exam, 'I intend to recieve a PhD'

Full expl-all facts rs 

Reasons essay - outline

3 typ rs-W=nor

S norm r JSA-mot ext

typ Ds-and Rs, Owen as ex

W on int r

Kantian rs 

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