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phil ethics m


undefined, object
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Intuitionism - Two Types

Moral intuitionism-view in ethics, Ross

Rational intuitionism - view in metaethics, Ross and Moore 

Separate views - one does not imply the other.

20th C concerned with rational 

Moral intuitionism

Moral-moral pluralism-plurality of moral first principles and no principle that underlies and justifies them

Ross adds can be conflicts and inelim need exercise jud resolve

Rational intuititionism

Basic m concepts r g w not analyz in nonm (pos eachother)

First m p or ps se props about kinds of consid are good grounds for saying x is intrinsic good-se truths about good reasons fixed order ind prior concep scheme, rat intuit

Rational intuititionism and moral motivation
basic assump is recognition of first principles as true and se gives rise, in being capable of rat intuit them, a desire act from them for own sake
Rational intuititionism and compatible moral views


Moore's Ideal Utilitarianism-consequ p organic unity is his view extremely pluralistic-few if any useful first ps and cases decided by intuition-good of combination of pleasure, beauty truths known intuition

Ross-reasons given

Arguments for Rational intuitionism

Moore's OPA meant to be argument for (1)-basic moral c not analyz terms nonmor

Ross-refl intuition, reached suff matur and special attention to prop, guide in ethics like sense data in nat science-uses OQA against M, right op

People accused of running afoul of the Naturalistic Fallacy

Mill defines 'good' as the object of desire

Bentham seems to define 'right' as 'conducive to the greatest happiness' (at least according to Sidgwick, who says princ tells us that actions are cond to GH as they are cond to

Moore's conclusion about property of goodness
simple, unanalyzable property knowable by rational intuition
Moore on definitions

Unclear whether concepts or properties

Real definitions-describe real nature of object or notion, not with those tell us way certain words commonly taken mean

Possible only when concept or object complex-horse has many properties can be enu

Frankena - Definist Fallacy

fallacy of confusing one object with another, defining one by the other

Ex-confusing pleasure and redness - fallacy say one means other

Butler-everything is what it is and not another 

Naturalistic Fallacy

Confusing one non-natural object with a natural one, defining one by the other

Saying pleasure is good meaningless if good means pleasure. 

Open Question Argument - for claim that 'good' is simple and indefineable

Complex prop-whatever def, always asked with sign whether good, so two diff not-ex:g=what d to d, but ask 'is it good to d to d x', anal 'do we d d d d x', nothing so complicated



Ross and OQA

Moore defines right in terms of good-x is right iff x prod greatest intris value compared available alternatives

Right and optimific are not synonymous so not same concept or prop 

OQA and relation to is/ought problem, fact value - Frankena

Nothing do NF

Epic, p sought all men, so p good, commit is/ought-add 'what sought all m g', not i/o, but NF?-might be intuition, deduction from pure ethic, but if def then NF

No nec conn-pl and r, no io, g p, mistake is NF 

Hume's point - ought / is
ought statements cannot be derived from is - ethical conclusions cannot be drawn validly from premises which are non-ethical
Response to OQA - no interesting analysis

OQA assumes imposs for concep analysis to be true and interest

A terms B infor, must be poss ask sign whether A thing is B, but OQA assumes only way analy correct is for it not sign ask-corr only if uninfor

Most anal t+i, sign ask color rea

Response to OQA - synthetic a priori

2 concept refer same property-water H20

concept good may be indefin, but poss other conce pick same prop and that prop may be simple or complex, nat or nonnat

M meaning in head, satisfy criteria of app satisfies conc-but mean det causal connec
Response to Open Question Argument - Frankena's response
assuming open q whether x also good begs question analytical natural-conviction open must be well grounded before justified appealing for purposes arg-but if ethic nat correct, convic not well-founded-saying open concept confu-so appeal to convic only if
Mackie - Error Theory and his assumptions about mroal judgments and truthmakers

The view that a belief in objective values is built in to ordinary moral thought and language, but holding that this ingrained belief is false


m props have sort magneti-intrins action guiding and motivating 

Mackie - argument from relativity

well-known variation moral code-society period, within socie-seem reflect adherence to different ways life rather than facts-sometimes from factual disa or prejudice

radical differen bt first order ju make difficult treat as app object truths&nbs

Mackie - response to argument from relativity

obj not specificrules but general basic princip, implic recog across societies  - so applying basic principles

Mackie - argument from queerness

If o val, would be entities, qualities relations of strange sort-intrins action guiding, knowable ways different from ordinary, need account how relate nat props-not like anything have good reason believe eixst

Ex-Forms, knowledge intri action gu

Mackie - epiestimic element - Argument from Queerness
if aware, have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from ordinary ways of knowing everything else
Harman's argument - causal theory of knowledge and objectivity

obj of j depends on suit expl wi causal theory k

j obj iff content of j is (in part) outcome app kind causal process affecting sense experience, say, on which j based

j 'cat on mat' result app caus proc affec exp of cat
Harman argument - types of beliefs covered

familiar expl of such exp on which perc j about medium sized phys objects based

Event cog psy fill in story theor j-t phys, j obj bc have expl showing affirmed result approp causal proc related world's being way think 

Responses to Harman - causal req
Question whether causal req part of appropriate conception of knowledge for judgments of theoretical reason - ask how go for theoretical physics and mathematics
Harman argument - moral facts

m facts need not figure in causal chain expls why make mj

expl j wrong ignite cat not require that fact-need only talk about sensibility, psychology, non-moral facts

no way mf affect perceptual app, nihilism (no fs) expl mf no role expl

Harman - response - and cognitive psychology
absence expl cog psy not point-being able give proof or state suff reasons for j is already best possible expl of beliefs of those who are reasonable and rational.
Harman - outline

Causal theory knowledge

problem with moral facts

Response - question theoretical

Response - not app practical 

 Response to Harman - meet halfway - grant caus req prt of app concep obj for j theor reason

caus r not essential all concep obj, not concp suit m and p ring-do not req rs for it show related app cau proc, or expl within cog psy

enough rs suff strong-expl j simply going grounds, expl lies rs sinc affirm-what more say except q sinc reason

Noncognitivism - Background

Naturalists and nonnat assume ethical terms refer properties and ethical statements are t or f

Look to use of mj and regard as disguied commands or exclam-surface form looks normal indic, invest use clues meaning

Job sent-expr emo, order, s

Noncognitivism - the view

function and meaning of ethical utterances best understood regard as commands, excl or some type other than those state facts

Denies ethical utt t or f in sense that corresp or fail to moral facts 

Emotivism - Ayer and  Stevenson

Atts conflict, some have do behavior others, many care about

Have ethical opinion is have att, norm expr mj-not subj, m dis about facts that may influence atti

Mag-mj att others-f in part affect

No state facts, or if do, secondary to

 Advantages of early emotivism - free talk of nonnatural properties, intuitions and rational insight

OQA-one sort nat objec Firth-good met r not believe nonnat prop Mackie

Intuit-mj unverif-intu certin to one may not-unless poss provide criterion decide confl, appeal int bad as test of prop valid

Ayer-syn sign only if emp ver

Advantage early emotivism - function language

good ev m lang funct way emotive view-mag and expr att-espec if allow expr facts about speaker's at, just not prim role

Prob-expr quite different influencing action

Advantage early emotivism - good evidence internalism - have ethical j essentially involves having ethical attitude

Arg from disagree in ethics-why not agr in m akin to science-dis what expect, but can be explained of course

Em expl why moved do what think right-nonnatural more difficult-but does not show nec connection-facts human nature

Mj meant change

Hare's revision of early emotivism

abandon magnetism since less well supported

mj not expressions of personal attitudes but of impersonal or moral attitudes

Hare's view - features - (1) prescribing
mj viewed as species presc-done by commands, requests orders-tell us do rather than what is case-presc and desc different use and meaning, maybe same grammer
Hare's view - Features - (2) universal prescriptions

general mj dist class prescr-universal presc-apply any agent and act in relavant cs-wrong smoke applies everywhere, don't smoke here only in these cs

impl mj reflexive-apply speaker

rough-say x right, presc act and any rel similar act a

Hare's view - features - (3) Expression, (4) Generality

Expression-since giving presc includes acceptance, issuance m presc includes accp of it by speaker-so mj both directives and expr of one's acceptance for onself 'let me not smoke'

Gen-UP dir all people, no proper names rigged dd 

Problem with Hare

What does prescrib amount to since mj do not issue orders, make requests or give commands

common element might be commending, but what is it to commend, other than express onself as being in favor of a certain thing 

Problems with emotivism - (1) features mj emotivism has no expl for

think of them as true and false

regard mj as mistaken, not just different, not just like differences in attitude 

Emotivism - problems - (3) what is actually expressed

if say emotions like indignation and horror, often make mj when no emotion like that

some attitude or incl but need think about whether these attitudes are always present 

Gibbard - background

main concern with 'makes sense' or 'rational' do

noncog-being something makes sense do not property attributed action, rather meaning is explained by saying what state of mind her words express 

Problems with emotivism (2) -  Frege Geach

owed expl for meaning of mj when used in more complicated contexts-lying wrong is boo lying, so what is meaning in 'if lying is wrong then I will not lie'

interact in inf and arg-torment cat and brother-meaning conditional

Gibbard's View

say makes snese for agent do x is express one's accept system norms that, as applied to agent's c's, permits the thing

System norm-end result ways various gen norm ps person accepts combine and balance-develop ass all actions 'N-f

Gibbard - system of norms

System norm-end result ways various gen norm ps person accepts combine and balance-develop ass all actions 'N-for, opt, req'-by system

Gibbard - objective and subjective rationality

obj- advisable-what makes sense light all facts

subj-rat-makes sense available info

Think x rat is accept system subj app norms permit act, since being N-per is desc fact, thought comb norm state and fact belief 

Gibbard - embedded contexts - what state of mind being expressed?

S stat with norm terms, WN norm fact world, W complete fact desc and N compl syst norms

S holds in WN, replace each norm pred in S with N corresp, yielding purely desc S'

S holds WN iff S' holds W 

Content is set fact nor

What objectivity is not

valued all


descriptivism-meaning purely descr-but concept different object

Plato-Forms eternal, extra mental realities

Kant on objectivity
to say objective is say it would be endorsed from a particular, reasonable standpoint

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