Women and the Law

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Meritor Savings Bank V. Vinson: Facts of the Case
After being dismissed from her job at a Meritor Savings Bank, Mechelle Vinson sued Sidney Taylor, the Vice President of the bank. Vinson charged that she had constantly been subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor over her four years at the bank. She argued such harassment created a "hostile working environment" and was covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Vinson sought injunctive relief along with compensatory and punitive damages against Taylor and the bank.
Conclusion
The Court held that the language of Title VII was "not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination," finding that Congress intended "'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment. . ." The Court noted that guidelines issued by the EEOC specified that sexual harassment leading to non-economic injury was a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. The Court recognized that plaintiffs could establish violations of the Act "by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." The Court declined to rule on the degree to which businesses could be liable for the conduct of specific employees.
Harris v Forklift Systems Inc.: Facts: In 1986, Teresa Harris, who was employed as a rental manager with Forklift Systems, Inc., complained about comments and behaviors directed to her by Forklift's president, Charles Hardy. She claimed that Hardy's sexually harassing conduct caused her to suffer PTSD-like symptoms and that she was ready to resign when Hardy apologized and claimed he was only kidding. Later, after concluding that the harassment would not stop, she left Forklift and filed her complaint with the EEOC.

Issue: Whether a sexual harassment plaintiff must prove not only that the conduct complained of would have offended a reasonable victim, and that the plaintiff was in fact offended, but also that the conduct caused the plaintiff to suffer serious psychological injury

Title 7 doesnâ€™t require physical harm
Rene v MGM Grand Hotel: Gay man files for sexual harassment against coworkers who continually was sexually harrased.
State V Norman: Facts: Defendant was the victim of years of abuse by her husband. D and medical experts testified that defendant was certain that her husband will kill her. D shot and killed the husband while he was asleep.

Procedure: Trial ct. refused to instruct the jury on self defense. Ct. of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.

Issue: Was the Court of Appeals correct in ruling that the jury should have been instructed on self defense under the given facts?

Holding: No

Rationale: According to the court, in order for there to be self defense, the defendant must face imminent danger of death of great bodily harm.Imminent is defined as: â€œimmediate danger, such as must be instantly met, such as cannot be guarded against by calling for the assistance of others or the protection of the law.â€ In the current case, the husband was asleep. D went to her motherâ€™s house and got the gun and when the gun jammed, she fixed it and then shot the husband three time in the head. She could have used other avenues to seek help, but she chose to kill. Dâ€™s belief that her husband will kill her is too indefinite and cannot be considered imminent. Therefore, the trial ct. was correct in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense.
State v Rhodes: The defendant was indicted for an assault and battery upon his wife, Elizabeth Rhodes. Upon the evidence submitted to them the jury returned the following special verdict:

"We find that the defendant struck Elizabeth Rhodes, his wife, three licks, with a switch about the size of one of his fingers (but not as large as a man's thumb), without any provocation except some words uttered by her and not recollected by the witness."

His Honor was of opinion that the defendant had a right to whip his wife with a switch no larger than his thumb, and that upon the facts found in the special verdict he was not guilty in law. Judgment in favor of the defendant was accordingly entered and the State appealed.

HEADNOTES: 1. The laws of this State do not recognize the right of the husband to whip his wife, but our courts will not interfere to punish him for moderate correction of her, even if there had been no provocation for it.

2. Family government being in its nature as complete in itself as the State government is in itself, the courts will not attempt to control, or interfere with it, in favor of either party, except in cases where permanent or malicious injury is inflicted or threatened, or the condition of the party is intolerable.

3. In determining whether the husband has been guilty of an indictable assault and battery upon his wife, the criterion is the effect produced, and not the manner of producing it or the instrument used.

Our conclusion is that family government is recognized by law as being as complete in itself as the State government is in itself, and yet subordinate to it; and that we will not interfere with or attempt to control it, in favor of either husband or wife, unless in cases where permanent or malicious injury is inflicted or threatened, [*457] or the condition of the party is intolerable. For, however great are the evils of ill temper, quarrels, and even personal conflicts inflicting only temporary pain, they are not comparable with the evils which would result from raising the curtain, and exposing to public [**6] curiosity and criticism, the nursery and the bed chamber. Every household has and must have, a government of its own, modeled to suit the temper, disposition and condition of its inmates.

It will be observed that the ground upon which we have put this decision is not that the husband has the right to whip his wife much or little; but that we will not interfere with family government in trifling cases. We will no more interfere where the husband whips the wife than where the wife whips the husband; and yet we would hardly be supposed to hold that a wife has a right to whip her husband. We will not inflict upon society the greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence. Two boys under fourteen years of age fight upon the playground, and yet the courts will take no notice of it, not for the reason that boys have the right to fight, but because the interests of society require that they should be left to the more appropriate discipline of the school room and of home. It [**10] is not true that boys have a right to fight; nor is it true that a husband has a right to whip his wife. And if he had, it is not easily seen how the thumb is the standard of size for the instrument which he may use, as some of the old authorities have said; and in deference to which was his Honor's charge. A light blow, or many light blows, with a stick larger than the thumb, might produce no injury; but a switch half the size might be so used as to produce death. The standard is the effect produced, and not the manner of producing it, or the instrument used.
United States V Morrison: United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) is a United States Supreme Court decision that examined the limits of Congress's power to make laws under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

hat fall, at Virginia Tech, freshman student Christy Brzonkala was allegedly assaulted and repeatedly raped by Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, members of the school's football team. During the school-conducted hearing on her complaint, Morrison admitted having sexual contact with her despite the fact that she had twice told him "no."[1] College proceedings failed to punish Crawford, but initially punished Morrison with a suspension (punishment later struck down by the administration). A state Grand Jury did not find sufficient evidence, in its opinion, to charge either man with a crime. [2] Brzonkala then filed suit under the Violence Against Women Act.

The Supreme Court's United States v. Morrison decision overturned the civil rights part of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994, although program funding remains unaffected. The Act allowed victims to sue their attackers in federal court because of statistical evidence that states didn't prosecute crimes against women as often as crimes against men. In spite of what justices Breyer and Souter described as "a mountain of evidence" that violence against women affects interstate commerce, the Court majority ruled that VAWA exceeded congressional power under the commerce clause and the equal protection clause.
American Booksellers Association v Hudnut: Indianapolis enacted an ordinance defining "pornography" as a practice that discriminates against women. "Pornography" is to be redressed through the administrative and judicial methods used for other discrimination. The City's definition of "pornography" is considerably different from "obscenity," which the Supreme Court has held is not protected by the First Amendment.
To be "obscene" under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), "a publication must, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest, must contain patently offensive depictions or descriptions of specified sexual conduct, and on the whole have no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Offensiveness must be assessed under the standards of the community. Both offensiveness and an appeal to something other than "normal, healthy sexual desires" are essential elements of "obscenity."

Test:
1.Purient
2.Patently offensive Sex Depiction
3.No Serous scientific political to literary value or value
Jones v Hallahan: Facts: Two female women want a review of a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit court that did not let them get married.

Procedural Facts:
Kentuckyâ€™s statues relating to marriage of not include definitions that indicate if marriage is only for a man or a women, they need to establish it by common usage, they use various dictionaries that all indicate marriage is between a man and women.

Issues
The defendants are not able to marry because of their own incapability of entering into a marriage as the term is defined since in all cases marriage is defined to be between a man and a women.

Holding
The case holds n favor of the previous ruling

Ruling
The court rules in favor of the previous decisions because marriage is defined to be between a man and a women.
Goodridge v Dept of Health: Facts
The plaintiffs, seven lesbian and gay couples from across Massachusetts, were denied marriage licenses at their local city or town halls. They asked the court for a declaration that they have a right to marry under Massachusetts law. The defendant is the Department of Public Health (DPH) because DPH is charged under Massachusetts law with enforcing state laws that pertain to marriage.
Procedural Facts
On November 18, 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rules that same-sex couples have the right to marry in Massachusetts under the state Constitution. The couples have been in committed relationships from seven to 32 years, and seek civil marriage and the protections and security it uniquely provides. They live in Boston, Newton, Whitinsville, Orleans and Northampton. Four of the seven couples are raising children.
Holding
In Goodridge et al v. Department of Public Health, the stateâ€™s highest court ruled that denying marriage to gay and lesbian couples violates the equality and liberty guarantees of the state Constitution. Because the government is continuing to deny certain eligible same-sex couples the right to marry. seeking the freedom to marry for same-sex couples in Massachusetts.
Reasoning
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage in unconstitutional under the equality and liberty provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution. (â€œ[W]e conclude that the marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due process or equal protection.â€) To remedy this constitutional violation, the Court stated â€œWe construe civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others. This reformulation redresses the plaintiffs' constitutional injury and further the aim of marriage to promote stable, exclusive relationships.â€ It also added, â€œ[E]xtending civil marriage to same-sex couples reinforces the importance of marriage to individuals and communities. That same-sex couples are willing to embrace marriage's solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring place of marriage in our laws and in the human spirit.â€
In re Baby M. (1988):: Facts: This case deals with the concept of surrogate parenting. Mrs. Whitehead agrees to be the surrogate parent for Mr. and Mrs. Stern, two both very successful individuals that are unable to conceive a child. Mrs. Whitehead and the Sterns draft a contract acknowledging that the Sterns will assume financial responsibility for the pre-natal and birthing requirements of the child, and in turn, Mrs. Whitehead will terminate all natural parental rights upon birth.

Procedural Facts: This was a tricky case and involved a decision from the lower courts that was later was reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Mrs. Whitehead successfully completed all tenets of the contract except the last one, the termination of her parental rights. Now, Mrs. Whitehead has decided that she would like to keep the baby.

Question: Does the contract, entered into by the Sterns and Mrs. Whitehead, able to force Mrs. Whitehead to terminate her parental rights and relinquish the child to the Sterns?

Holding: The lower court of New Jersey implemented the â€œbest interests of the childâ€ criteria and the court determined that the Sterns would be the best situation for the child.

Reasoning: The rational for this case utilized a nine point criteria developed by Dr. Salk, that asked the questions about the environment for raising a child. Due to the fact that the Sterns are educated, successful, in marital harmony, and are ready for a child, the court held that they would be ideal situation to raise a child. Mrs. Whitehead already has 2 children, has problems with her alcoholic husband, and irresponsible does not provide for an ideal environment for the child.
The case was remanded to the New Jersey Supreme Court for review, and the Supreme Court did not agree with the finding of the lower court. First, there are specific laws around adoption such as paying for a child, consent of adoption after the baby is born, documents providing proof of unfit parental influence or abandonment, and these elements were overlooked by the lower court in making their decision. The Supreme Court granted joint physical and legal custody to the biological father and to
Mrs. Whitehead.
Bradwell v Illinois: Facts of the Case

Myra Bradwell asserted her right to a license to practice law in Illinois by virtue of her status as a United States citizen. The judges of the Illinois Supreme Court denied her application with only one judge dissenting.

Question

Is the right to obtain a license to practice law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to all citizens of the United States?

Conclusion

No. While the Court agreed that all citizens enjoy certain privileges and immunities which individual states cannot take away, it did not agree that the right to practice law in a state's courts is one of them. There was no agreement, argued Justice Miller, that this right depended on citizenship. In his concurrence, Justice Bradley went above and beyond the constitutional explanations of the case to describe the reasons why it was natural and proper for women to be excluded from the legal profession. He cited the importance of maintaining the "respective spheres of man and woman," with women performing the duties of motherhood and wife in accordance with the "law of the Creator."
In re Marraige of Iverson: The trial court entered a judgment dissolving a marriage. Among the issues in the matter were the validity of a premarital agreement and which party had initiated the marriage. In finding against the wife on these issues, the court remarked that the wife, whom he referred to as a "girl," was "lovely," "did not have much education," had "nothing going for her except for her physical attractiveness," and that the husband was wealthy but did not look like "Adonis." In regard to the fact that the couple was living together before the marriage, the judge remarked "why, in heaven's name, do you buy the cow when you get the milk free." (Superior Court of Orange County, No. D274356, Ragnar R. Engebretsen, Judge.)

The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial on all issues with directions that the presiding judge of the superior court assign the matter to a different judge. It held that the remarks of the judge demonstrated that he entertained preconceptions of the parties based on gender bias such that the wife could not have received a fair trial. Also, for guidance on remand, the court held that, as the party attacking the validity of the premarital agreement, the wife bore the burden of proving its invalidity. (Opinion by Sills, P. J., with Wallin, J., concurring. Separate concurring opinion by Moore, J.)
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B.: Facts of the Case

Alabama, acting on behalf of T.B. (the mother), sought paternity and child support from J.E.B.(the putative father). A jury found for T.B. In forming the jury, Alabama used its peremptory strikes to eliminate nine of the ten men who were in the jury pool; J.E.B. use a peremptory challenge to strike a tenth man in the pool.

Question

Was the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely because of their gender a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection bars the exclusion of potential jurors on the basis of their sex, just as it bars exclusion on the basis of race. "[G]ender-based classifications," wrote Justice Harry Blackmun for the majority, "require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny." As a consequence, "[P]arties still may remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias."
Griswold v. Connecticut:1965: acts of the Case

Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Both she and the Medical Director for the League gave information, instruction, and other medical advice to married couples concerning birth control. Griswold and her colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized the provision of counselling, and other medical treatment, to married persons for purposes of preventing conception.

Question

Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives?

Conclusion

Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, create a new constitutional right, the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicts with the exercise of this right and is therefore null and void.
Eisenstadt v. Baird: Facts of the Case

William Baird gave away Emko Vaginal Foam to a woman following his Boston University lecture on birth control and over-population. Massachusetts charged Baird with a felony, to distribute contraceptives to unmarried men or women. Under the law, only married couples could obtain contraceptives; only registered doctors or pharmacists could provide them. Baird was not an authorized distributor of contraceptives.

Question

Did the Massachusetts law violate the right to privacy acknowledged in Griswold v. Connecticut and protected from state instrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court struck down the Massachusetts law but not on privacy grounds. The Court held that the law's distinction between single and married individuals failed to satisfy the "rational basis test" of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Married couples were entitled to contraception under the Court's Griswold decision. Withholding that right to single persons without a rational basis proved the fatal flaw. Thus, the Court did not have to rely on Griswold to invalidate the Massachusetts statute. "If the right of privacy means anything, wrote Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. for the majority, "it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion tino matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to whether to bear or beget a child."
Griswold v. Connecticut: Facts of the Case

Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Both she and the Medical Director for the League gave information, instruction, and other medical advice to married couples concerning birth control. Griswold and her colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized the provision of counselling, and other medical treatment, to married persons for purposes of preventing conception.

Question

Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives?

Conclusion

Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, create a new constitutional right, the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicts with the exercise of this right and is therefore null and void.
Bradwell v. Illinois: Facts of the Case

Myra Bradwell asserted her right to a license to practice law in Illinois by virtue of her status as a United States citizen. The judges of the Illinois Supreme Court denied her application with only one judge dissenting.

Question

Is the right to obtain a license to practice law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to all citizens of the United States?

Conclusion

No. While the Court agreed that all citizens enjoy certain privileges and immunities which individual states cannot take away, it did not agree that the right to practice law in a state's courts is one of them. There was no agreement, argued Justice Miller, that this right depended on citizenship. In his concurrence, Justice Bradley went above and beyond the constitutional explanations of the case to describe the reasons why it was natural and proper for women to be excluded from the legal profession. He cited the importance of maintaining the "respective spheres of man and woman," with women performing the duties of motherhood and wife in accordance with the "law of the Creator."
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Sex Discrimination, patriarchic society, sovereignty
In 1978 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez and affirmed the power of self governance for all federally recognized Pueblos and Tribes. While the case arose from a dispute about membership qualifications that differentially treated male and female members, this CLE is not restricted to this topic. This CLE will address the impact of the important Santa Clara principles: tribal sovereignty, tribal sovereign immunity, and when federal law and federal court review are appropriate for internal law.
The ordinance, enacted by the Santa Clara Pueblo Council pursuant to its legislative authority under the Constitution of the Pueblo, establishes the following membership rules:
"1. All children born of marriages between members of the Santa Clara Pueblo shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
"2. . . . [C]hildren born of marriages between male members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-members shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
"3. Children born of marriages between female members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-members shall not be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
"4. Persons shall not be naturalized as members of the Santa Clara Pueblo under any circumstances."
Ferguson v. City of Charleston: Facts of the Case

After an increase in the use of cocaine by patients receiving prenatal care, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) started to cooperate with Charleston to formulate a policy to prosecute mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth. MUSC obstetrical patients were arrested after testing positive for cocaine. They filed suit challenging the policy's validity on the theory that warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches. Among the District Court's actions was an instruction to the jury to find for the patients unless they had consented to such searches. The jury found in favor of the city. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the searches were reasonable, reasoning that special needs may, in certain exceptional circumstances, justify a search policy designed to serve non-law-enforcement ends.

Question

Is a state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment if the patient has not consented to the procedure?

Conclusion

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the diagnostic tests constituted an unreasonable search if the patient has not consented to the procedure. The interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine cannot justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant. Examining the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens wrote that a special need is "divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement," and that under the city's view "virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate...purpose."
Kantaras v. Kantaras: Michael, a transsexual father, has been fighting for almost seven years to retain his parental rights to his two children, aged 16 and 13. This case first made national and international news in 2002, when Court TV aired the entire three week dissolution and custody trial. Michael's former wife knew he was transgender when they married, but when Michael filed for divorce, she attacked the validity of their ten-year marriage-and Michael's status as a legal parent to the couple's two children-based solely on Michael's transgender status. In February 2003, Circuit Court judge Gerard O'Brien issued a groundbreaking decision holding that Michael was legally male, affirming the validity of the marriage, and awarding Michael primary custody of the couple's two children. In July 2004, the Court of Appeal's reversed Judge O'Brien's historic Order, voiding the former couple's marriage. The appeals court sent the case back to the trial court to determine Michael's parental rights. After hearing about the case, television celebrity Dr. Phil invited the couple to be on his show and encouraged them to mediate the case for the sake of the children. After two all-day mediation sessions, the parties reached a settlement in which Michael retains all of his parental rights and responsibilities and will continue to share legal custody with the children's mother.
In re Fauziya Kasinga: Female genital mutilation.
In re Fauziya Kasinga, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") has taken a long-awaited first step and granted asylum to a young African woman who escaped her homeland and came to the United States in order to avoid genital mutilation.13 Part I of this Comment provides background information on FGM, the types of procedures involved, its physical and psychological effects, and the reasons offered for its continuation. Next, Part II discusses human rights in the international context, and addresses some of the reasons why women's rights, although protected in theory by international human rights doctrine, are not typically secured in practice. Part III examines pertinent United States immigration law and the requirements to obtain refugee status. Finally, Part IV explains the BIA's rationale in the Kasinga decision as well as its potential effects on future gender-related asylum claims.
Smith v Salem: "sex stereotyping based on a person's gender non-conforming behavior."[71] Determinations about transexualism or GID are no more influential than a doctor's classification of a plaintiff's birth genitalia. Thus, individuals need not identify as a transsexual, be diagnosed with GID, or in any other way conform with medical evaluations of the mind or body in order to control their own gender expression.

Finally, Smith states that, regardless of labels, all individuals are entitled to their own gender identity choices without fear of discrimination. Holding, "[s]ex stereotyping based on a person's gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior[,]"[72] the court forecloses attempts to recast impermissible stereotyping as alternative forms of discrimination that are somehow more tolerable-in this case, discrimination on the basis of transsexualism.[73] Smith explains that a "label . . . is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim."[74] It explicitly rejects the practice of labeling contra-gender performers as an unprotected class, such as transsexual, homosexual, or transvestite.[75]

More than protecting transsexuals, the Smith court's matured understanding of "sex" promises reform across the broad landscape of sexual inequality.[76] Smith upturns rigid sex categories and allows both sexes to participate in the full range of gender expressions. Scholars have anticipated and argued for this transformative approach as a means to sexual equality. When courts recognize that men can "wear frilly pink dresses"[77] and may "have vaginas,"[78] they break from the traditional devaluation of female attributes. With female and male traits made equally available to the sexes, gendered characteristics can move towards being appreciated as equals.[79] Moreover, the movement away from community norms frees women from the sex stereotypes that have traditionally been imposed against them. The ability to participate in the masculine sphere endows women with increasingly equal opportunity.
Redmond v. Kingston: Facts: The petitioner, Redmond, a counselor at an institution for drug-and alcohol-abusing minors, was convicted of statutory rape of Heather, a 15-year-old resident of the institution. The specific charge was that he had traded cocaine to her for sex.

Procedural Facts:

Issues: The evidence of the false charge of forcible rape was not cumulative of other evidence bearing on Heather's credibility, because none of the other evidence either involved a false charge of being sexually assaulted or furnished a motive for such a charge. The fact that a teenage girl has a disordered past and lies a lot (who doesn't?) does not predict that she will make up stories about having sex. To indulge such an assumption would be to place such persons largely beyond the protection of the law. But the fact that the girl had led her mother, a nurse, and the police on a wild goose chase for a rapist merely to get her mother's attention supplied a powerful reason for disbelieving her testimony eleven months later about having sex with another man, by showing that she had a motive for what would otherwise be an unusual fabrication.

Hold: Reversed

Ruling: The judgment is reversed with directions to order the petitioner released unless the state retries him within 120 days of the date of this decision.

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