phil ethics
Terms
- Conclusion of GW2
- we are subject to moral duty if and only if we are rational agents with autonomy of the will
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Establish for Kant
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task of defending the common presumption that the principle is rationally binding
Synthetic style of argument
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Formula of Universal Law
- we ought to act only on that maxim which we can at the same time will that it should become a universal law
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Formula of Universal Law of Nature
- act as though the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature
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Formula of Humanity
- act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your person or in any other person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means
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Formula of Autonomy
- act only on maxims that are consistent with the will’s own universal lawgiving
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Kingdom of ends Formula
- All maxims from one’s own lawgiving are to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends’
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Meaning of Autonomy
- If and only if we are rational agents with autonomy of the will, we necessarily accept, as our own rational standards, the formulas of the CI
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Common belief in duty warranted
- f and only if we are rational persons with autonomy of the will (or at least if and only if we are justified in thinking so)
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Error of Previous moral theories
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they fail to see that morality, properly understood, presupposes that moral agents have autonomy of the will
Not rationally self-governing but ruled by something else<
- Kant on sentimentalism
- Kant seems to understand sentimentalist theories as recommending that we be kind and just to others beca
- Seeking for Kant
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to identify formulations of that standard that express its essential features
Analytic style of argument
- Imperative
- an expression of an objective principle (a command of reason) to an imperfect will
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categorical imperatives
- unconditional requirements of reason that says you must do x and not just because doing so will promote your contingent ends
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The Categorical Imperative
- a necessary and comprehensive standard of rational choice that says in effect that one must do x regardless of whether doing so promotes one’s contingent ends
- If there are such relatively specific categorical imperatives, there must be a CI
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ci's tell us rationally nec
standards rationality that wrong in those c's, not just b/c fails to further interest
need comprehensive, nec requ to x whether conforms or not
supreme leader for state
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The Gap
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The concept of a CI tells us that it would express a requirement to conform the maxim of our proposed action to the law and that the law is unlimited by any further condition
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Problem with FUL
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Maxim description
Maxims not in head, so which description, but if allow moral considerations then no independent standard of rightness or wrongness for particular acts.
- Ways to violate FUL
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Contradiction in conception
Promising - I will break my promises when this will advantage me - but as universal law of permission, anyone anywhere break promises, but idea of promise is under obligation even if not in my intere
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Problems with FULN
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Causal or teleological laws
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Thick interpretation of humanity formula
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We should understand the idea of human dignity, or humanity as an end in itself, as a cluster of prescriptions about how to regard and treat human beings
&
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Problems with Humanity Formula
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Kant's claim that all humans have humanity - argument from how rational agents conceive of themselves and from setting ourselves ends.
Tragic dilemmas
- Autonomy
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Rationally self-governing
author - legislate universal laws independent of incl.
subject - only subject to universal laws that we legislate from standpoint.
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Interpretation of Kingdom of Ends
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ideal that treats moral requirements as the normative 'laws' that agents, as
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Description of parties and motivation in KOE
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rational - think logically do not make laws without good reason
autonomous - author and subject without being motivated by inclination
Abstract from personal differences - set aside knowledge of personal differences and special intere
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Advantages of KOE
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Avoid problem of maxim description - finding system of moral principles like laws of state, and check moral status of an act by comparing it under any description to system of principles, and might require actions along with maxims.
Help us to th
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Point of conclusion of GW2 argument
- What it means to be a rational agent with autonomy of the will is to be bound by the principle of autonomy, and this principle is practically equivalent to the categorical imperatives which are presupposed by morality, so morality presupposes that we are
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Mill - Principle of Utility
Greatest Happiness Principle
- actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness
- Mill on Happiness
- is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure
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Mill's Hedonism
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happiness is desirable as an end and the only thing desirable as an end in itself. All other valuable things are valuable only as parts of or means to happiness.
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'Tendency' in Mill's Principle of Utility
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the probability that acts of that kind have been found to promote happiness.
- Qualities of Pleasure for Mill
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Hedonism doctrine worthy only of swine objection
Differences in qualities of pleasure
Competent judges - experience of both, self-conscious, self-observant, set aside moral obligations and expected consequences - if prefer it th
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Problems with the competent judge test
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Sidgwick - quality is quantity under a different name or it is a non-hedonistic value
Why set aside moral considerations and expected consequences - can't just say because of circularity
Mill deserting Hedonism - if lexically prio
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Sidgwick - Classical formulation of utilitarianism
- acts are objectively right insofar as they increase utility, objectively wrong as far as they diminish it
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Act utilitarianism
- an act is right just in case no other act open to the agent would produce more utility
- Bentham's Principle of Utility
- approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question<
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Sidgwick's argument for the Principle of Utility
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equity-not right treat diff only if num ident
rat prud-mere diff time not reason ground more regard wb
rat benef-good one person no more important 'pov universe' than another
bound aim at good generally
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Arguments for classical utilitarianism
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- Intuitively speaking, morally right to impartially promote what ultimately matters - pleasure and absence of pain
- Sidgwick's argument
- Mill's proof
- Rawls - applying to morality the principle of rational choice for on
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Moral percepts for Mill
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History shown that when generally followed, respected, taught and socially enforced, conducive to utility and essential for members of a society to enjoy a decent standard of living.
Prohibitions on stealing, breaking promises, failing to respect
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Wrong for Mill
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To break percepts in normal circumstances
means that a person who violates one of them ought to be punished for doing so.
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Duty for Mill
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What we may be compelled to do - what may be exacted from us, 'as one exacts a debt'
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Percepts of justice for Mill
- Percepts that assign rights to particular individuals, which gives them valid claims on society to protect their possession of whatever they have a right to.
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Right for Mill
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Rights give people valid claims on society to protect their possession of whatever they have a right to.
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Tom on Mill on wrong
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strictly speaking, it is wrong to violate the moral percepts except when doing so would produce more utility.
One way to reconcile 2 and 5
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What 'Mill's Proof' is trying to prove.
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Hedonism - that happiness is desireable and the only thing desireable as an end, all other things being only desireable as a means to that end.
Takes consequentialism for granted, as did Sidgwick and Moore.
- Type of proof that Mill's proof is
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Mill says cannot be roof in ordinary and popular sense-questions of ultimate ends are not amenable
first premises of knowledge subject to direct appeal to senses, first premises of value of ends subject to appeal to our desires.
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Mill's proof - Happiness is desireable as end
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sole evidence possible produce anything desireable as end is that people actually desire it.
- Hobbes - absurdity
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somewhat like absurdity-vol undoing that which beginn vol done
judge good-change mind
perf-meaning under ob, so if use correctly but fail then contradic
no prudential reason even if absurd
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Mill's Proof - Happiness is the only thing desireable as an end
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Human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means to happiness, so nothing else is good to any person.
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Mill's proof - general happiness is good to the aggregate of all people
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Each person's happiness is good to that person
The general happiness is therefore good to the aggregate of people
- Mill's proof - The general happiness is the only good to the aggregate of all people
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Each person desires nothing that is not either a part of his happiness or a means to it.
Nothin
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Conclusion of Mill's proof
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The general happiness therefore is a good to the aggregate of all people
Nothing is a good to t
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Mill on psychological hedonism
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Premise people only desire happiness as an end
Process of association and habit formation, pleasure not always object of desire, not all motives are anticipation of them.
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Mill and methodological premise
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Deny intuitive faculty
Analogy between desireable and visible
knowledge of visible is experience, knowledge of desireable comes from desire.
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Aggregation and Mill
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Individual instances of happiness are good (by method. point) so 'to each person' represents location, not point of view.
Reason people value own happiness commits them to others
- Problem with aggregation point and Mill
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Sidgwick - Some people hold that what is valuable is their own happiness, not happiness per se.
But what is so special about your happiness?
- Will
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Rational being with a will is able to make things happen, app explanation refers to principles, laws or reasons on which she acted.
Connect event and person's beliefs and committments.
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Task of GW3 - Establish
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there actually are unconditional requirements of reason that are independent of desire and inclination
synthetic or constructive
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Outline of Mill's proof
- H desireable as end, H only thing desireable as end, GH good to all people, GH only good to aggregate of all
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freedom of the will - conceived negatively
- we think of our choices as not causally determined by prior natural causes beyond our influence, and we can act for (non HI) reasons.
- Freedom of the will - conceived positively - autonomy of the will
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Rationally self-governing
Author and subject of law - CI principles - not adopted because of feelings and inclinations
- Negative freedom entails positive freedom
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Must be laws that explain why effect is attributed to person's will.
Not causal laws - b/c ind. of determination
Subject to different laws - self-imposed laws.
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Main problem with GW3
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Free will might be capable of following only HI
Can explain why did what did
So why think laws must be independent of our ends?
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Positive freedom to morality
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person with autonomy has CI as standard of choice
This is the principle of morality - so all rational agents are under moral laws iff have (neg) freedom of the will.
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Rational agency to negative freedom
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r. will cannot act except under idea of freedom
..is free from practical point of view - in acting, suppose have genuine options
all rational beings free from this s/p
We take up this s/p here, so all rat have freedom of the wil
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Conclusion of GW3
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all rational agents under moral laws
We are rational agents - take ourselves when deliberate about what to do
So we are subject to moral law
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Rationality of moral conduct - Kant - two ways show irrational if act immorally
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(1) acting contrary to principle he himself accepts
(2) rational agents are nec committed to principle, so violating it is irrational
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Epicurus - goal or end of life
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our own static pleasure - natural and familiar
kinetic - lack or need is removed
Static - pleasure once pain is removed - no anxiety.
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Types of desires for Epicurus
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necessary - for food
unnecessary - specific type food
empty - based on empty beliefs that make trouble for person who has them.
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Epicurus' moral theory
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egoistic hedonism
we ought to seek our own pleasure because it is our final goal or end, and we ought only to do this -
Virtues for Epicurus
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living virtuously is part of our final end of pleasure
Living virtuously requires us to seek virtue for its own sake
prudence is highest virtue - prudential motivation and wisdom on how to achieve final end
Justice
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Epicurus on justice - contractual nature
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result of contract enter and uphold because of need for security and fear of punishment
Constant calculation leads to fear and anxiety.
If no real fear, might not act justly.
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Epicurus on justice - character trait
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Once contract in place - best achieve final end by stable character trait to behave justly for own sake rather than out of fear of punishment - calculation point.
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Problems with Epicurus
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(1) how are virtues part of final end
(2) why act virtously when not in our interest?
(3) less plausible if no natural teleology
(4) not moral conception because generality
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Hobbes - characteristis of parties
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Predominant egoism
death-aversion
rough equality
Forwardlooking
Conflicting desires among each other
- Hobbes - right, liberty, power
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Right is a liberty
liberty is absence of external impedimants on a person's power
Power is the capacity to use means to satisfy present and future desires.
right to x iff I can use my power to use X as I wish
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Hobbes - right of nature
- liberty each man has to use his own power for the preservation of his own nature
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Conflict in state of nature - Hobbes - Rationality account
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Competition over resources - always searching for means to satisfy desires
Limited scarcity - desire same things
Rough equality - so compete
Distrust out of fear - preemptive strike
Glory-seeking
- rational self-interest model - Hume
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did not subscribe-skeptic pr
responses to sensible knave provide further reasons why someone who adhered to this model would have reason to be moral
- Some laws of nature - Hobbes
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1. seek peace
2. Lay down all rights for peace if others do so as well
3. Fulfill covenants
4. Gratitude
- Hobbes -in foro interno and in foro externo
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everyone must desire that the laws of nature are satisfied
only sometimes rational for a person to perform acts
keeping covenant serves ends only when others willing to do same.
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Awful conditions in state of nature - Hobbes
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domestic aggression - conflict
foreign invasion
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Extricate from state of nature - Hobbes
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Parties will form a contract to tranfer (nearly) all of their rights to a soverign who will have absolute power over them.
Bilateral contracts with each other or unanimously give away their rights to a conquering soverign.
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Transferring a right - Hobbes
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Transferring a right amounts to renouncing one's liberty to hinder others from exercising their right to that thing.
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Contract - Hobbes
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mutual transferance of rights
- Covenant - Hobbes
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people form a contract in which they mutually transfertheir rights and one or more of the parties agree to perform after the contract is made.
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Injustice - Hobbes
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breaking of covenants.
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Obligation - Hobbes
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if you transfer a right, you are under an obligation not to interfere with the benefit of the person's right.
Should be fulfilled because of absurdity and self-interest argument
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Hobbes' Foole
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In the state of nature, thinks it is not against reason for a person sometimes to break her covenants in the SON.
Athiest
Does not fear divine punishment
No problem in civil society - penalties too great
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Hobbes' response to the Foole
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Acts against right reason because his actions foster a reputation of untrustworthiness that will be detrimental to his long-term interests
Or he acts on the basis of an irrational assumption that he will not be found out as such a person.
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Hobbes' argument for absolute soverign
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a limited power in civil society must be limited by something with greater power, and this regress will end only when there is an unlimited power, which is the sovereign.
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Point of agreement - Hobbes
- Hobbes argues that the only rational point of agreement among people in the state of nature is to institute an absolute sovereign and ‘authorize all his actions’
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Hobbes' moral theory summary
- the correct moral rules are what rational, strongly death-averse and predominantly self-interested people living in a state of anarchy would agree to when choosing the social arrangements by which they will all live.
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Problems with Hobbes
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(1) We are social creatures so no idea about state of nature, and whether solves problem
(2) real or hypothetical?
(3) inadequate response to Foole
- benevolence virtue - Hume
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Sympathetically identify with pleasure it tends to bring others
moved by feeling of sympathy.
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Natural virtues - Hume
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traits people naturally possess and naturally approve of from general point of view
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Hume - virtue
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a virtue is any mental quality that tends to give rise to approbation, 'by the mere survey' from a general point of view
sympathy
GPV - sympathetic working, type of trait, usual effects
Useful and immediately agreable - ourselv
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Artificial virtues - Hume
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approve of from general point of view though people do not naturally possess them.
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Why no natural motive to justice - Hume
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self-interest
benevolence - sometimes not to common good
duty - sense act is virtuous, which is same as sense that motive of act is virtuous, and this is motive trying to explain
- Why live in social groups - Hume
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substantial prudential advantages for everyone - utilize divisions of labor and mutual protection
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Conventions that will become established - Hume
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stabalize possession and transfer of property
emerges gradually as people come to see benefits
results over conflict of material resources.
Public knowledge of all following, will be mutually advantageous.
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Hume utilitarian?
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not utilitarian - did not think conventions justiifed by conduciveness to general pleasure, wellbeing or whatever.
instituting and following certain conventions can be very useful - broadly understood in terms of mutual advantages.
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Circumstances of justice - Hume
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Society is a system of mutual cooperation
Identity and conflict
Conventions useful
Limited scarcity - Golden Age and Shipwreck (E)
Moderate selfishness - Utopianism
Intelligence - Hobbes
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Sensible knave
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occasionally acts unjustly and conceals acts through deception
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response Hume's sensible knave
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(1) risk found-punished and excluded from coop
(2) Own conscience and others-natural approval of justice
(3) diff knowledge of how evade
(4) improper prudential judgment - worthless toys and gewgaws.
(4) good people be
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Why annex virtue to justice? - Hume
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When take up general point of view, notice harm of injustice
sympathetically identify with displeasure, so led to disapprove of character traits that cause them to act that way.
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Butler - method
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watch
natural teleology - inevestigate human nature itself, by looking at various parts of soul, each have own function
virtue - soul works well when each part plays their proper role and standing in app relations to other parts
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Parts of soul - Butler
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Conscience on top
self-love (2 order desire that our particular affections fulfilled)
general beneficience (2 order desire for good of others)
no contrariety
particular affections (some towards and away us)
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Particular affections - Butler
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principles of action or movements towards particualr objects or events
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Paradox of egoism - Butler
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Without particular affections for certain things, self-love could not employ itself on anything
So all of my motivations cannot be 'that my desires that benefit myself are satisfied'
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Reasonable self-love - Butler
- satisfaction of the affections we have as a result of calm deliberation
- Particular benevolence - Butler
- second-order desire that some particular affections of another person are satisfied (and because it would be good for her, rather than because it would make me miserable)
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General benevolence - Butler
- desire that everyone do well - and we have this desire because we care about their good.
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Reasonable self-love, reasonable benevolence and conscience - relation
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Conscience gives appropriate expression to all basic natural dispositions - this is its role
so these three all coincide
if understand true happiness or true benevolence, always lead same way
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Butler - Conscience
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approves our x in a cool hour after taking in facts
a law to ourselves
natural role-govern other faculties-give them natural expr-bring conduct before it
add motivation
action is right is sentiment of underst and a percep
- Reasonable self-love and reasonable benevolence - relation
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Happiness is satisfaction of particular desires
Some of these are for good of others
happiness consists in part in passions having to do with good of others - so often coincide
nature requires them fulfilled in due degrees
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Morality and Immorality- Butler
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Acting differently from what conscience recommends (which is our nature)
So a departure from our nature.
We ought to act in accordance with our nature in a rational way.
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Virtue - Butler
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Virtue consists in following and vice in deviating from human nature.
A fitting life is one in which parts are working together properly- and this is one in which we are following our nature.
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Problems with natural teleology
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(1) Metaphysical
(2) Fact/Value - Hume and Hobbes worry, only descript. or normative (flourish), or some unholy mix
(3) descr of behavior not vindicate
(4) asking how to live
(5) reason no set goal
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self-interest and morality -consequentialist model - rationality as seeking to maximize intrinsic value
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draws other-regarding and self-regarding requirements from a common source - judgments of intrinsic value
many things means to intrinsic value
reasons derive from promoting this value
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psyhological egoism - Butler - problem
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psych egoism - all human action motivated by concern for self
sl cannot be only motive since requires partic desires
So must care about things other than own happy
Acting from concern for sl can make less happy
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Butler - problems - 2
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Natural teleology-more inspiring than convincing that rsl never recom. injustice
What are we deliberating about?-sure requires calm cool hour, but what criteria do we use and what makes it morally binding? - intuition, sentim, rational (dp)
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laws of nature - features - Hobbes
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Dictates right reason
hi's - rider 'if seek peace (means to s-preserv), then do x if others as well'
immutable and eternal
delivered by God
bind in foro interno (to desires)
not always in foro externo (actions) - problems with self-interest model - rationality, morality, self interest
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pursuing good of another or end (artistic project) for own sake is ir
ir to forgo some benefit to onself
break rules if slightest benefit even if huge sacrifice to others
psych egoism - emp false (Hume and Butler)
<
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what be's morality
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concerned primarily or entirely with our relations to others
especially requires some sacrifice with regard to pursuit of (immediate) self-interest
(maybe) universal, general principles
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reasons for self-interest model - rationality and morality
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Not conceptual claim since we can deny the view without self-contradiction
Not intuitive or self-evident
historically - emp. psychological egoism-not tautol, but B and Hu show emp false
Even if pe true, would not show req rat.
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egoism - types
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taut - always act satisfy own desires
causal-desire SOA according to amount of benefit found to afford us in past-but could be other-regard
max
non-max-ultimate aim is personal benefit
predomin-si motives precedence <
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rationality and morality - efficiency model
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pr requirs us to take the best means to our ends or give up the ends
Hume-ends are not in themselves ir-called if adopted on basis of ir belief
HI
thought how achieve ends and adjustment of ends
- rationality and morality - efficiency model - advantage
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allows many types of ends - other-regarding and self-regarding
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rationality and morality - efficiency model - problems
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does not require high priority on own interests
or on interests of others - Hume, not irrational to prefer destruction of world to scratching of finger
break moral rules (murder, rape, promises) if best means to ends - but counterintuitive&
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reason and morality - consequentialist model - advantages
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same source for self-regarding and other-regarding reasons from same source - so good of others and ourselves give reasons to act directly, rather than our own good or personal ends
makes interests of others weigh heavily in deliberations
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Method of ethics - Sidgwick
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any rational procedure by which we determine what we ought to do by voluntary action.
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rationality and self-interest - Kantian model
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we have sr and or desires
Auton-don't always act on basis of strongest desire-act acc to principles
HI-reason pursue adopted end-revisable
rat nature inescap committed HI and CI-GW2
Contingent ends not rat nec choose-gwq&nbs
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Bentham - pleasure and pain
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Psychological h-ultimate source of acts
ethical h-only pleasure and pain valuable
structurally similar-felecific calculus to measure value of acts-intensity, duration, fecundity, purity (pl does not lead to pa), remoteness, extent, certaint
- rationality and self-interest - Kantian model - advantages
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(1) doesn't give priority to si
(2) place high priority on si and oi - playroom for free choice for imperfect duties
(3) status of persons and respect moral rules
(4) agent relative restrictions - you ought not murder rather than
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Kantian response to egoist
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assumes all moral agents are committed to CI
all have wille (disposition) force us to recognize authority of moral law
Conscience will torment you - social animals
Conscience of others
moral pleasure from acting right
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consequentialist model - rationality and morality - problems
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(1) metaphysical and eplistemic
(2) does rationality require each person to maximize agent neutral goods
(3) do these prescriptions closely resemble what we would recognize as morality
(3) is this how people tend to make decisio
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Hobbes right reason
- Right reasoning - correct prudential reasoning about interpersonal behavior
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rational self-interest view
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basic r requires that we act that will best promote our si
interpret si-pleasure, balance, desires for our own benefit
si distinct from interests of others-may coincide-Butler
moral-inner rewards virtue, reputation
< -
Natural teleology model -self-interest and morality
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What we ought to do is act according to our nature, and when we do so, we give the best expression to our self-interest.
When we are acting according to our nature, we are acting morally and we are as well off as we can be.
Plato, Aristotle
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Problems with deriving morality from natural teleology model - 1
- Plato, Aristotle and Butler are more inspiring than persuasive that human nature is so constituted that when we follow it, reasonable self-love, proper appetitive part never recommends immorality
- derive morality from rational self-interest model - ways
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1divine pun E-no afterlife and god beneficient
H-takes up task-Foole denies god
(2) Inner-rewards of morality - H-no guilt or conscience E-less anxiety
(3) External sanctions security, punishment, reputation
- consequentialist model - self-interest and morality
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moral requirements regarding ourselves and others derive from the same source - agent-neutral intrinsic value.
What we ought to do is maximize intrinsic value, and this value includes our own interests along with the interests of others.
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Problems with Mill's proof
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Methodological
Psych hedonism - assoc and habit
Happiness desirable to general happiness
- Outline of essay on error previous moral theories - GW2
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morality presup - concl of moral re iff raw
seek/establish
defintiions
duty-ci-CI form aut error
other theories
- Gloucon's taxonomy of value
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A-goods-we choose only for own sake
B-goods-we choose for sake and conseq
C-goods-we choose only for conseq
B-finest, both good making properties-justice
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Plato - justice
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psychological state, state of character
has sort of power makes life just-constituitive powers
praise just life is praising justice.
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Types of lives Gloucon considers
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perfectly unjust, just
just-strip away all aspects not part of justice, including reput, and assume unjust reputation
unjust-not just, but reputation for it
wants shown that just person happier (eudaimonistic benefits) than unjust
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Gloucon's challenge-outline
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Division goods
point is show justice is B-good
justice-character, powers
two types of lives
life just happier
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Socrates' response to Gloucon
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rulers, soldiers, merchants perform function
justice iff each elements serving role
Book 4- same thing not at same time do or suffer opposites in same respect and in relation to the same thing-confli desire
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Problems with Socrates' response
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psych, epis, metaphysics
3-par-soul rather than object parts, exhaustive class.
Q's about reason and natural teleology
our justice-requires act for good of others even if harm self-since only inner-relations, worry not defended ou
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Socrates on reason
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rule other parts
knowledge of the Forms, including Form of Good
valuable for person and soul.
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Circumstances of psychic justice
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conditions nec for justice to exist and be maintained in a soul
just def true philosopher
implicit-discuss what it takes to be true philos
soul, three parts, phil nature, free time and training, severe pain
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just life happiest
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4 def types, spir, nec app, unnec app, lawless app-arist happy
compare to tyran-enslaves least able do what wants-not ruled by reason, nec to do best for soul.
phil-ask what best, answer, act-most free and do-large eudom dividends.
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Outline arguments for Hume's claim that moral distinctions are not based on reason - 5
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(1) Conclusion of 2.3.3 - reason no influence, mor practical
(2) r ideas+facts, appro discov t+f, objects of moral are ori exist
(3) irr beliefs
(4)cause effect (5) relations of reason
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moral distinctions not based on reason - practicality argument
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reason alone no influence - 2.3.3
mor practical-how interpret
emperical-ext can accomodate
express emotion or univ prescript-then internalist
language only used to expr emot-so mj nec means sentiment
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moral distinctions not based on reason - Hume - second argument
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echo 2.3.3
role r discover r of ideas and matters of fact
condems appro discov t+f
objects of moral-volitions, character, action-are o.e. not t+f
r not approv cond these, which meant do
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problem with second argument - Hume - moral distinct not based reason
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moral of volit and acts not consist in conformity to reason in very limited sens-morality not consist in being t+f
Other arguments concerned with ways reason might do so.
- 2.3.3 - reason slave passions
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d and p always employed 'some design'd end or purpose' so not->act alone
passions orig exist not t+f, and all reason has reference to, so passion cannot be opposed or endorsed r
tr-b cause desires, no mediate - ir b
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moral distinctions not based reason - third argument - irrationality
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acts on false info or takes insuf means, ir, might be moral judgments
not her act but beliefs ir
typically people not deserve moral approval on acting on irr beliefs, so reason not lead to moral judgement
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moral distinctions not reason-fourth - causes and effects
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reason condem or approve causes or effects of actions, vol charac - and these can be t+f
But immor of these does not rest solely with their causes and effects
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moral distinctions not reason-fifth-nature reason
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reason discove: resembl, contrar, degree quality, m of fact
mj not drawn from these or any combination, for any offense, always be case same relation but not considered offense.
When consider a, v, c alone, not lead judg-examine ourselves f
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Conclusion and point of moral distinctions not based on reason
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dif v and v not t or f, and not drawn from reason, so must arise in part from sentiment
consider moral offens, see impressions ones find agreable and vice disagreable
general point of view
- Kant reply Hume on moral distinctions - a priori method
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reasons a priori find CI
not from examples-cannot know acting on good reasons
only a priori establish univ and nec propos morality presup-if all follow a p, not show nec to do
cannot find by HI, so method not based inclin.
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Kant's reply to Hume on moral judgments and reason
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beliefs only move combined disposition-reason alone can move
K's r robust-cognitive capac discern relati+fact, deep dispo (Wille) to ackn as author and act on abstract p's, HI CI-r part human nature.
mj subsume CI, all dispos follo
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Kant reply Hume - moral distinctions not based on reason - explicit argument for why reason demands act morally
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Summarize GW3
So mr are requ of reason, dispos to act in acc with requir, and mj subsume under those requir.
agree basic point need beleif and dispo
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Features of the KOE perspective
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fully r-nec means ends, logical and consit, good reason
a-rational law-independent desire inclin
ends-high valuehumanity
abstract pd-pers diff and special interests, know have-otherwise fully informed
- KOE - analogy with commonwealth
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'systematic union of various rational beings through common laws'
citizens in KOE are ideal citizens subject to same laws and ideal legisl are authors
disanalogy-Kant's KOE has a soverign, 'holy will' that wills essentia
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Kant's interpretation of KOE
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Ideal of moral motivation, inspire and motivate us, making moral law more accessible by expr it in way closer to intuition and feeling
idea appealing bc represents abstractly what world would be if all followed law
not decision guide-GW FUL, MM HF
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KOE - my interpretation
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Basic-KOE puts before us ideal that treats moral req as normative 'laws' that agents, as lawgivers, would give themselves (as subjects) if r and a
ought act in acc princ that we and others legisl as universal moral principles from a certa
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KOE - advantages
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all pov
act descr-system rules laws state-some acts directly-check moral status act compare every true descr
moral rules, exceptions, dilemmas
makes us source of rules
ideas other formulas
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Dignity in the KOE legislative perspective
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dignity constrains deliberation and motivates
grant rights and respect to others
rn as uncon and incompar worth pres, deve, honor
prima facie concern see each person's ends realized, or ensure freedom
cond allow devel and lead r an
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Legislating in the KOE
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find+res laws accept-r's can agree apart from inter
self-impos rules person diff, so morally nec b/c describe comit of mem, disreg factors
rat-laws consi not self-defeat
a-R's obeying them obeying, dignity
UL-gen and univ
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KOE - combines ideas of other formulas
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complete characterization of basic moral law
FUL-form maxim, FH ends of maxim, KOE complete determination of maxims
making U laws, which is constraint on maxims
ends in themselves
FA-ind of inclinations, give themselves moral la
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Problems with KOE - Utopianism
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supports utopian or clean hands arguments of untenable sort-rules by what will for perfect rat citizens, ignoring fact we live in imperfect world-acting can prove disastrous
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Problems with KOE - Utopianism - Response
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ideal simply problem in harmless way if ideal conditions fairly close
forcing us consider worthwhile perspec
find principles for ideal, might next ask what princ these people would choose for our world
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Problem with KOE - Determinate Principle
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may seem parties have sparse motivations, unable legislate enough determ principles
great deal of motivation however
principles choose very general, only recieve substantive content when applied to particular case - mid level principles
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Keep covenants in state of nature - Hobbes
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form covenants have justified fear that costs of non-performance outweigh benefits - worry failing to keep will hurt reputation and trustworthiness, and so jeopardize chances for survival.
right reason requires act prudentily, fulfill pervasive a
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Aquinas-basic supp ethical theory
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people have capacity for free choice and their actions are truly human only if made freely
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Aquinas - practical reason
will, willing
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set of capacities includes ability to understand and balance practical reasons (possible benefits of an action), devise plans and proposals, reason about effectiveness of plans
ability to respond to reasons intelligently, willing doing this
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Aquinas - natural teleology
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human nature explained by capacities, explained by acts, explained by objects.
human nature rqeuires analysis of acts.
- Basic human goods - Aquinas
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when have proper under, pr makes us nat attracted basic goods - truth, knowledge, justice, friendship
irreducible and intrins valuable for all humans
achieving one is sort perfection or fulfillment
impl is aim at wb of others si
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Virtue - Aquinas
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if bring about all, eudomonia Ar, beatitude Aq-impossible b/c trade off when instant
pr aims for beatitude imperfecto-incomplete fulfillment
virtue-aiming at common good-integral human good-and harmonizing delib and character with it and ea
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Derive rule - Aquinas - prive person ought not to kill any human being
Negative rules
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intrinsic aspect common good is basic good of life, certain acts contrary, since required will common good, ought not kill
true, exceptionless percepts
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Affirmative rules - Aquinas
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require perform but require further judgment how to apply them in cases-nec to morally good life, always relevant, but playroom for decising.
return borrowed goods, honor parents
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Aquinas outline
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practical reason-nat teleology, understand nature by objects of actions
when have understa, aim at certain goods-basic goods
beatitude imperfecto-virtuous life
law nature-good done, love neigh, neg aff
- Fundamental moral principle - Aquinas - self evident
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each good, princ says to be promoted-generalize-good done bad avoided'
unders goods, clear artic 'one should love one's neighbor as oneself'
intent loving is will person's good, all neighbors, so will cg
s e<
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Hobbes outline
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basic, life in SON-rat acct
Extricate-laws of nature-insuff
benefits coop-rights-contract transfer rights-oblig comply-absolu soverign
Foole
function s public system rules, laws of nature, penalties
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Epicurus outline
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psyc and eth hedonist-goal end is certain sort pleasure-absence pain
kinetic/static
Virtues
Justice-trait, contract (security punishment anxiety)
problems
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Butler outline
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nat teleo (watch)
parts of soul-relations
Morality
Problems
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Compare Mill's Principle of Utilitywith one or more Kant's formulations
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PoU and features, KOE and features
capture ideas, motivation, compatibility with personal projects, values and relationships, and moral basis\
GW3
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Kant on happiness
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personal contentment and success in achieving ends-moral constrain-nat end all humans
shift several ideas-all subject, indetermin and varaiable across persons, unattainable
cannot satisfy ends jointly, no determ idea whatwould be
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Limit role of happiness in Kant - value
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not uncon good-good will only good wo q-not worthy pursuit by rat agents in all contexts
no intrinsic values-things good by being object of rational willing
no aggreg-no scale personal and dign
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Limit role of happiness - not criterion of right action or unqualified goal of moral rules - morality constrained
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not always right do what expect max h, and rules not justified because general adoption promotes greatest h in long run
moral ass character, motive delib does not depend on effort and success pursuing happ-so promot h not generally reason do it
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Epictetus - goal or end of life - Stoic philosophy
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phil life, end eudaimonia, secured life of reason, living virtuously+acco nature
happiness is freedom from anxiety, freedom from passion, good feeling, awarness and capac attain what counts living rational being
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Epictetus - living according to nature
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pursuing life intelligently, responding one's needs and duties as sociable human being
accepting one's fat and fate of world which comes from divine intelligence makes world best
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Epictetus - main theme - actions are 'up to us'
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what is in our power is authority over ourselves that we have regarding capacity to judge what is good and evil
outside our power are 'external things' which are 'indifferent' with respect g+e-just happen not in power bc no absol
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Epictetus - example of what is up to us
- sickness not power since can't control when, or get better-makes sense visit doctor, but competence not in power or treatment-makes sense manage affairs carefully and responsibily but outcome not in power
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Epictetus - what is in our power
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capacity adapt ourselves to all that comes about, judge anything is dispreferred not as bad but as indifferent and not strong enough overwhelm strength of character
- Epictetus - human psychology
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all animals are motivated by impressions, but rat impr have content and require assent bf stimulates action
Rat animal examine content, can and should not assent impressions until sure correct-rediscribe situation so good bad in power
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Epictetus - virtue and goods
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unhappiness comes from mistaken beliefs what is truly good-pursuing lpeasure or wealth is mistake since do not benefit in all circ
virtue, capac use advant wisely, only candid for what is always benef, only good-so happiness-depend assent choice<
- If and only if we are rational agents with autonomy of the will do we accept as our own rational standards the supreme principle of morality. - Tom's interp
- supposed to be conclusion from formulations-what does idea of universal law mean-reformulat as acting confor laws give ourselves, which is being autonomous
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Error of previous moral theories - the moral theories
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Egoism-m is hi to hap
sent-m act directed by sent-r kind bc satisf inclin
divine-m follow god-r G comm, but not good in thems since rat cond exist G, knowl comm, r obey fear
Perf-prom most perf in obsc meta sen-mor means end
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'real' error of previous moral theories
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misint m in ways imply only r to be moral are based on hi-rat follow moral req only bc something else we happen to will-r to be mor only by appealing to concern for things not good in themselves and prin not rat nec
agen cap acting only sake thin
- 'real' error of previous moral theories - example of divine command
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reason be kind is god commands
does not make justice good in itself since rat of our being moral depends on exist god, knowledge divine commands and so on, and reasons to obey (fear, hope, etc.).